The paper explores the emergence and development of socially responsible investment (SRI) in Japan. SRI is a recent field in Japan. It is not clear which model it will follow: the European, American or its own model. Through the analysis of the historical roots of SRI, the key actors and motivations that have contributed to its diffusion, the paper provides explorative grounds to sketch the translation mechanisms of SRI in Japan and offers insight into its future path.
Introduction
SRI is becoming an international phenomenon (Tennant 2007) and has been diffusing amongst Asian countries, first to Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, then to Japan, and most recently to emerging Asian countries (ASrIA). The Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia (ASrIA) was set up in 2000 in Hong Kong as a non-forprofit, membership association to: "build momentum for SRI in the Asia Pacific region and to raise the standards of SRI practice, through fostering the creation of SRI products and services and through the provision of training and support services" (ASrIA website).
SRI is a new and developing field in Japan. The concept and practice of SRI has been recently transposed into a new and not fully predictable situation. Yet, Japan is a leading SRI nation in Asia outside of Australia, with 34 SRI mutual funds and 4 fund options for pensions with a total market value of 358 billion JPY (approx. 3 billion USD)
as of 31 January 2007.
1 While some reports document the historical and recent development of SRI in Japan (Solomon et al. 2004; ASrIA 2003; Tanimoto 2003; Kawaguchi 2006 ) as well as its prospects for mainstreaming (Kawaguchi, 2006 , Kato, 2006 ) and its limitations (Solomon et al. 2004; Japan Research Institute 2004, pp. 73-74) , very little has been done to analyse why and how SRI developed in Japan.
SRI perceptions and practices obviously vary across different nations and cultures (Sparke 2001).
It is not clear which model Japan will follow: the European, the U.S. or its own and unique model. According to Latour (1986) , practices need to be adapted to fit new social contexts, which means reinterpretation or translation (Czarniawska and Joerges 1998; Czarniawska and Sevón 1996; Olson et al. 2003) . Hence, one may expect SRI in Japan to find its own and specific form.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the emergence and development of SRI in Japan; its specificities in addition to commonalties with European and U.S. SRI practices. It seeks to answer to the following two questions.
 What are the characteristics-actors, vocabulary, strategies and historical roots--of SRI in Japan?
 What model for SRI in Japan --US, European or its own?
1 The data was provided by Japan Research Institute. The calculation does not include the asset under management for pension funds. 1euro =149 JPY. See Table 1 .
Final version, May 2008
4
The paper provides explorative ground to sketch the translation mechanisms of SRI in Japan. It investigates not only the historical roots of SRI in Japan but also the key players and motivations that have helped its proliferation and translation in this new institutional context.
The paper relies both on secondary sources of information, including SRI funds brochures and prospectus, existing surveys and studies, as well as informal discussions with practitioners and finally the authors' observations and experiences.
Japan's context for SRI development
SRI is perceived and practiced differently in different national socio-economic contexts. As Tessa Tennant, Founding Chair of ASrIA puts it: SRI is understood as screened funds and shareholder action in the US, while more of opportunities for clean energy, water and eco-efficiency in Europe. While some leading funds in Australia have chosen to invest in nuclear activities, in Japan "it is also about CSR nationally with a certain discomfort at looking at the behaviour of Japanese companies globally". 2 Japanese companies use cultural mechanisms such as philosophy and guiding principles to address CSR without formal administrative processes typical to Western companies (Lewin et al. 1995, p.95) . 3 Yet, their moral obligation is confined within the "community of interest" excluding minorities and foreigners (Wokutch and Shepard 1999) .
SRI was imported to Japan and introduced to Japanese companies in the late 1990s when the country was going through a period of "soul-searching" and confidence-building, following a decade of economic recession. This period can be described as confusing and paradoxical (Kim 2004) . Four main factors explain this context of confidence-building.
First, largely due to salient pollution after the high-growth era (Solomon et al. 2004 ), there was a consensus or 'common value' since the 1970s among central and local governments, companies and the population to regulate pollution, an externality of 2 The view was expressed in her article entitled ""Socially Responsible Investing around the World", Special 15th Anniversary Issue Summer 2007, GreenMoneyJournal.com.
3 Nippon Keidanren adopted the Charter for Good Corporate Behavior in 1991. Solomon et al. (2004) and Kim (2004) argue that it sought to discipline the corporate sector with ethics and compliance through several revisions of the Charter in 1990s.
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companies (Machii) . In the late 1980s and 1990s, a wave of strengthened environmental standards were arriving from Europe especially with regard to the extended producer responsibility, recycling and take-back measures embodied in the EU's WEEE and RoHS directives. Influenced by EU developments, the Japanese Ministry of Environment requested companies to publish environmental reports in 1997, which later resulted in a burgeoning number of environmental reports as well as ISO14001 certifications (Solomon et al. 2004 ). Despite of their belief in good environmental track records (Keizai Doyukai 2004) , Japanese companies are under more and more pressure not only from the EU but also more recently from Chinese legislation.
Second, Japan's economic success, built on the Japanese corporate governance model, lost its foundation in the economic doldrums of the 1990s. Japanese companies were criticized both from within and outside of Japan for its model of balancing the interests of various stakeholders including wider society (Kim 2004) . Amid debates on a new model of Japanese governance throughout 1990s (Sakuma 2001) , the Japanese government revised the Commercial Code in 2002 to allow an Anglo-Saxon way of management control through the committee system (auditing, remuneration and appointment) combined with an independent board of directors. Third, scandals started to become a daily feature of corporate Japan, despite widely-held views that Japanese companies are social institutions delivering philanthropic contributions, life-long employment and seniority (Kim 2004 The Tokyo Stock Exchange data. 7 The triangle merger, which allows foreign companies to acquire a Japanese company via a Japanregistered subsidiary as effective from July 2007, is likely to magnify Japanese companies' urge to stay Japanese.
8 Supporters of the other view claim that an embryonic form of SRI appeared earlier, in the 1980s in the form of shareholder activism triggered by a nuclear plant accident (Tanimoto, 2003) . However, it was more a single incident, as shareholder activism on ESG issues did not take root afterwards.
Management in an interview in 2003, investment funds such as mutual funds or pension funds are quite recent in Japan: "Japanese prefer the bank deposit to the investment"
claims Eiichi Takeda 9 . The first Japanese eco-fund emerged in a timely manner for mutual funds investment in 1999-2000 as well as in an increasing awareness of the Japanese public on environmental issues (Tanimoto 2003; Kabeya 2004) . In this context, eco-funds have been imported from the West and introduced into the market as new financial products.
- 12 Two pension funds belonging to KDDI and Shinsei Bank mandated Sumitomo Trust Bank to manage 25 billion JPY through the SRI fund (Solomon et al. 2004) .
series of initiatives were rather a counter proposal to Western SRI criteria and the massive arrival of SRI questionnaires from overseas. Japanese companies felt strongly that some of the Western SRI criteria were not relevant to Japanese companies (ASrIA 2003, p.1).
According to them, SRI overseas assumptions and criteria addressed the wrong problems in Japanese society (ASriA 2003; Solomon et al. 2004; Sakuma 2004 ). There was a common feeling that no country should attempt to inflict its ethical beliefs on another (Wong 1991; Bowie 2004) . The Japan Association of Corporate Executives in fact issued a White Paper on CSR to highlight "Japan's way of CSR". However, individual companies exposed to cross-border business had a pragmatic reaction -both pride for Japan's practice, and interest in international standards for CSR. Western SRI questionnaires have nevertheless had a significant impact on the growth of domestically designed SRI funds and Japan-relevant CSR criteria and methodologies.
Today. The initial expansion has been followed by the introduction of a second SRI index, (Louche 2004; Gond and Louche 2005) . SRI rating organisations are today recognised as the professional body, the 'experts' on SRI. This seems to be the case in Europe, the U.S. as well as in Japan.
In total there are 15 SRI research organisations active in Japan, which is a lot compared to Europe and the U.S. and shows how fast SRI has developed in this country.
Similar to Europe and the U.S., there are two main forms of SRI rating organisations in Japan: independent SRI research organisations, domestic and foreign, and affiliated SRI research organisations. Affiliated SRI research organisations are different from in-house SRI research: they are think tanks dealing with multiple themes and are affiliated with financial groups (see annex 2 for more detailed information).
The group of domestic independent SRI rating organisations consists of three organisations: Good Bankers, IntegreX and Morningstar/CPRD. Good Bankers, established in 1998 by a former Japan-based employee of a European bank, was the first Japanese SRI rating organisation. Good Bankers played an important role not only in linking ecology with mutual fund products, but also in encouraging Japanese financial institutions to rethink their business model and be more innovative. In its mission statement in Japanese it states:
"…we have reached the conclusion that the financial sector, through the provision of financial products and services should contribute to societal progress and development, should be able to go out of the present impasse and explore new clients and markets. ….Good Bankers will introduce the concept 'SRI' as a new product line and will provide and plan diverse products and services that will match the changing financial market in the post-Big Bang era". Bankers -the revival of Japanese management rather than aiding financial institutions out of an impasse. It stresses that the integrity and sincerity of managers is the core of good management in Japan and due to this the need for a Japan-specific SRI approach. The President of IntegreX claimed on its website: " ….. it is important to develop SRI that is suitable to Japanese society and culture in order to build safer, fairer and better Japan. ….If we succeed in creating a mechanism by which the integrity of corporate management is translated into market competitiveness, it will benefit not only companies' improved brand image, but also adds values to stakeholders… ".
In one of her recent books, she wrote: "SRI, which was started in the US, as a means of embodying Christian belief, will be reborn in Japan as a means to support the fundamental corporate goals, namely, economic efficiency, competitiveness and sustained growth. Japanese companies are able to regain a success model of "Japanese management" (Akiyama and Hishiyama 2004) . -------Insert Table 1 ------
Japanese SIF
As in many European countries and the U.S., Japan has its own 'SIF', Social Investment Forum. SIF Japan was officially set up in November 2003 and has its origins in a study group formed by companies, NGOs, academics active in the GRI Forum Japan The lack of interest from the financial community may be explained by a competition factor. Indeed, several practitioners active in Japan's SRI argue that once 18 Stock at Stake was also founding member until its merger with Vigeo Group. 19 The third voting member active in SRI research in Japan is Good Bankers. 20 The other stakeholder members of the SIF Japan board are: three CSR related NGOs, two academics, one company, one securities company-related research institute (Daiwa), two consulting companies specialising in CSR and one SRI independent research organisation (IntegreX) and one affiliated research organisation (JRI) .
one's competitor is in one organisation, it does not want to join that organisation. While Daiwa Securities are in, Nomura Securities has no interest, and while IntegreX and other SRI leading persons are in, Good Bankers has no interest, for example. In addition, SIFJapan's secretary-general is the same person as Sustainability Forum Japan's secretarygeneral. Co-founder of CPRD is affiliated with the Sustainability Forum Japan through its auditor role. Another noteworthy point is that SIF-Japan is not a voting or associate member of ASrIA, while the Korean Sustainable Investment Forum (KoSIF) is an associate member. SIF Japan seems to struggle not only to reach the status of a ´pivotal platform´ domestically, but also international recognition, without ASrIA membership.
Our observations and numerous discussions with actors in the SRI Japanese field lead to the conclusion that the Japanese SIF remains an unfocused organisation with a rather ambiguous role. As of today, it is difficult to predict whether it will become an important actor in the field or stay marginal.
Financial institutions and SRI funds
Financial institutions have been a passive group of actors in Japan's SRI arena. As while the coverage on investor relations (IR) remained between 400 and 500. 22 The prime reasons for companies to take up CSR were popularity in the media (66.7%), CSRconscious activities in economic associations such as Keidanren (56.7%) and SRI questionnaires (39.3%), while internal reform to combat scandals (13.3%) and benchmarking (10.7%) were found in a minority of companies. Keidanren surveyed 1,324 member companies during the period March -April 2005 (response rate: 43%). http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2005/066.pdf
Definitions and Vocabulary
Definitions and vocabulary are important indicators of the national 'identity' of SRI.
Although we can find some similarities with Europe and the U.S., there are also interesting and unique features within the Japanese SRI field. (Table 1 ).
Definitions
There are roughly three sets of vocabulary in the Japanese SRI scene: eco-efficiency/ecofriendly, compliance/integrity, and 'CSR'. 23 Eco-efficiency, which has been promoted by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, is a variation of the business case for CSR, in which improvements in the handling of environmental matters results in efficiencies in the manufacturing process, and hence in competitiveness and profit (Louche 23 Some other SRI funds also give part of their return to charities.
Approaches to SRI
Despite the textbook definition of SRI adopted in Japan, Japanese SRI is predominantly screening. No engagement is acknowledged amongst Japan's SRI The screening criteria specific to Japan are of legal and administrative compliance.
These types of indicators typically focus on Japan-based or non-consolidated entities' human resources practices, which is another dissimilarity from European and U.S.
screening criteria, which focus more on consolidated performances.
These criteria are found mostly in the human resources area where there has not been much enforcement. 29 Companies failing to achieve the required rate have been allowed to compensate by paying 50,000
JPY per missing disabled person per month.
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In February 2003, after a series of guidelines the Pension Fund Association (PFA) unveiled the PFA Proxy Voting Principle, because it needed to encourage Japanese pension funds to vote (Yano, 2004 , Yoshitaka, 2006 in light of rising foreign ownership.
The PFA Principle successfully created a wave of shareholder responsibility to not endorse proposals blindly and do cast a vote (Yano, 2004; Yoshioka, 2006) .
A recent study by Jacoby (2007) documents evidence of limitations of US-style shareholder activism in Japan due to persistent cultural obstacles. Jacoby (2007) investigated CalPERS' involvement in Japan. He showed that over the last 15 years CalPERS has shifted its initial solo activism, to local partnerships and finally to companylevel 'relational investing'. RIETI (2003) also points out that proposals submitted by individual shareholders are considered odd and are almost never supported by the institutional investors.
Community Investing
Unlike Europe, community investing is considered more and more as an integral part of SRI in Japan. SIF Japan's regular media monitoring includes initiatives by local banks in raising funds for specific local issues. These types of activities are somewhat different from U.S. community investing, which focuses mainly on support for small, community-development banks, credit unions, and revolving loan funds. In addition, SRI investors focus on the community lending records of larger banks, looking for evidence that they lend to economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods and regions. The Japan
Research Institute, introduced a new definition of SRI as 'a provider of finance by way of investment or loans' in its 2004 report submitted to the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry (METI). (Table 2 ).
----------Insert Table 2 
Similarities and differences with Europe and the U.S.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that SRI in Japan holds a number of similarities especially with Europe. The main characteristics of SRI in Japan are summarised in Table 3 Overall, Japan has adopted a 'soft' version of European SRI, choosing for engagement rather than activism, and for positive screening rather than exclusion. This approach reflects the conflict-avoidance nature of Japanese society. The focus of SRI in Japan is not on bringing broad social changes, as some may describe the U.S. approach, but rather in stressing the financial and commercial benefits for both investors and companies. The preference for soft and conflict-free language, coupled with its origin as a new financial product, implies that aggressive or activist connotations of screening activities have not taken root in Japan. Moreover, NGOs and the civil sector (SIF-Japan , 2006) and consumer movements (Wokutch 1990 ) are relatively underdeveloped in Japan, which makes it difficult for SRI to address societal challenges from the point of view of the affected stakeholders of companies.
From the analysis of the emergence and development of SRI, the very determinant for Japan's SRI future seems not to be the interests of holders of "stakes" 31 but rather an institutional design to foster recognition of the Japanese management system. SRI in Japan is also unique because of the criteria SRI funds use. There are some divergences in terms of criteria between Japan, Europe and the U.S. As Siggelkow (1999) argued, investment fund managers (agent) should undertake decision-making on behalf of their investors (principle). This means that U.S. and European fund managers are accountable to U.S. and European investors, and Japanese SRI fund managers are accountable to Japanese investors. But one may argue that if both Western investors and Japanese investors focus on the real stakes faced by Japanese companies in local stakeholder relations, then screening criteria and indicators are likely to converge. This would mean that Western investors should adapt their criteria to the local reality. But this remains an open debate. In either case, if a perception gap between investors and fund managers can be mitigated through a more reliable and transparent analysis on the real state of companies' behaviour, it could help citizens in both regions to make more 31 One positive note is that the SRI community, partly influenced by UK legislation protecting whistle-blowers, played a part in legalising a whistle-blowing procedure. Thanks to this legislation, a formerly untouchable collusive practice amongst a dozen construction and building companies (Kyoryu affair) was scrutinised, and unpaid overtime salaries of 167,958 workers was unveiled by the Labor Standards Inspection Offices, resulting in 23.295 billion JPY premium payment imposed on 1,524 firms.
responsible choices as consumers and investors (Tencati et al. 2004) . Such a test case will be whether the recent high-profile legal and administrative non-compliance incidents, such as the anti-trust violation in the construction sector and the failure to pay claims in the nonlife insurance sector, will become an integral part of sector-specific sustainability analysis.
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------------ Table 3 In Japan, while some commitments towards mainstreaming have been observed, it is debatable if SRI will ever embrace mainstreaming in the future.  The government is interested in redesigning an economic system in which private companies including financial institutions are given a role in channelling household savings into SRI funds and community investment. According to Toyoda (2006) , if the increasing number of SRI mutual funds does not reach a comparable volume to the US and Europe, it becomes a natural and logical step for the government to forge an architecture driving a part of the financial assets of the highly- Japan is not an exception when it comes to SRI. Although it started relatively late compared to other countries--twenty years later than in the US and ten years later than in some European countries--SRI is gaining ground within the Japanese financial community.
Japan is joining the 'SRI worldwide movement'. As has been documented in several studies, SRI is diffusing across numerous countries ( (Boxenbaum and Gond 2005; Louche 2004; Louche et al. 2005; SiRi company 2005) .
In Europe, as in the US, the growth of SRI has been driven by a desire to redefine the relationship between companies and society and find mechanisms to exercise a quasiregulatory power over companies without direct governmental interventions (Louche and Lydenberg 2006) . Drivers in Japan have been of a quite different nature. The 6-year long growth of Japanese SRI has been driven by two main factors: first, a desire to create a market mechanism to channel household financial assets into SRI and the corporate sector;
and second, a desire to legitimize the Japanese management system through new sets of vocabulary such as eco-efficiency, ethics compliance, management integrity and social contribution in the eyes of the Japanese public and the world.
Conclusion and further research
SRI in Japan remains a unique case. Although it has imported a global concept, it has managed to adapt it to its specific national context. SRI in Japan does have some similarities with SRI in the U.S. and in Europe, but it shows numerous characteristics that are quite unique. SRI is going through a translation process which requires adaptation. This process is not yet over. The SRI field in Japan is still in a very dynamic construction process where changes are taking place at a very rapid pace. Therefore, as of today it is difficult to depict the future shape and form of SRI in Japan. But it is there and we expect it to stay.
Our finding has some practical implications for global SRI investors looking to invest in Japanese companies. The fact that the different drivers underpinning the Japan's SRI construction means that SRI investors need to consider the context in which Japanese companies operate in their evaluation and investment decisions. Contexulization might be able to reduce a gap between the perceived sustainability of companies and real state of companies. In this light, a new research is on the way to shed light on the role of contextualization in the SRI decision-making process. The paper also suggests two other areas of further research to enhance the understanding of the mechanism of translation in Japan's SRI field. First, an evolving relationship between the SRI rating and asset management companies needs to be examined due to the fact that the mainstreaming of SRI might have progressed beneath the surface in Japan. SRI Mainstreaming was accompanied by the in-housing of research in Europe. Such research will unveil the evolution of SRI inquiries in Japan's SRI scene and might support or contradict our initial finding. Second, the emergence and development of community investing in the Japanese context warrants further investigation. It is quite possible that the local grassroots movements amongst local cooperatives and NGOs who support the rights and well-being of disfavoured populations existed prior to the ´official birthday´ of SRI in Japan.
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